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TORTS
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE-MOTORIST STRIKING STANDING
FREIGHT TRAIN
Arkansas. The Arkansas Comparative Negligence Law1 re-
ceived recent application in the case of Hawkins v. Missouri Pac.
R. Company.'
Under the facts brought out in trial, plaintiff and a friend,
riding in plaintiff's automobile, collided with defendant's train
standing across a highway in the city of Paragould at about two
o'clock early one morning. Evidence showed that plaintiff had
been keeping a proper lookout and that the physical condition of
the railroad tracks at the scene of the collision was such that plain-
tiff apparently had a clear road ahead. The tracks, at the point in
question, were elevated some two or three feet above the regular
level of the highway; plaintiff was thus able to see an approach-
ing automobile's undimmed lights shining (as he was to discover)
beneath the freight train immediately prior to the accident. By an
unhappy coincidence, that part of the train standing across the
highway was an empty freight car with its doors wide open.
Through this opening plaintiff could clearly see a traffic light oper-
ating in the street ahead. Defendant railroad did not have an
active warning signal at the crossing, nor had any member of the
train crew been stationed on the road to warn on-coming vehicles.
Plaintiff was knocked unconscious and his car demolished in the
ensuing wreck.
After the evidence had been presented, the trial court, mindful
of respectable authority for the premise that an injured plaintiff
ordinarily cannot recover from a railroad company when an auto-
mobile has been driven into the side of a train standing across a
highway,' directed a verdict for the defendant.
In reversing and remanding, the Arkansas Supreme Court
quoted the language used in the case of Fleming, Adm'x, v. Mo.
I ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 73-1004.
2 ------------ Ark ............. ,228 S. W . 2d 642 (1950).
3Lowden, Trustee v. Quimby, 192 Ark. 307, 90 S. W. 2d 984 (1936); Gillenwater
v. Baldwin, 192 Ark. 447, 93 S. W. 2d 658 (1936).
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& Ark. Ry. Co.4 and repeated in the later case of Lloyd, Adm'x. v.
St. Louis S. W. R. Co.' to the effect that the true rule is that such
cases merely present a question as to the comparative degree of
negligence on the parts of the plaintiff and the railroad company.
The court also noted that a directed verdict is proper only when
there is no substantial evidence from which jurors, as reasonable
men, could possibly find the issues for the plaintiff.
In the instant case, thought the court, a jury might well have
found negligence in the defendant and, even though plaintiff might
also be found to have been contributorily negligent, such negli-
gence could very possibly have been of a lesser degree than that
of the defendant,6 thus warranting a recovery under the Compara-
tive Negligence Law.
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE-PRESUMPTION OF
DECEDENT'S DUE CARE
New Mexico. In the case of Griego v. Conwell' the New Mexico
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the theory that in a suit
under the wrongful death statute,' when the issue of contributory
negligence on the part of the decedent is raised, "the diligence
and due care of the deceased is presumed, and a verdict cannot
be directed against his representative on this issue unless reason-
able men could not differ in finding him contributorily negligent."9
The evidence showed that deceased had parked his car near
the center of the road on the right-hand side of the highway, with
headlights burning, shortly before midnight. Defendant Conwell
and his wife, approaching in an automobile from the opposite di-
rection, saw the headlights of the parked car but did not see the de-
ceased afoot on the road in time to avoid the accident.
Blood tests were taken on the deceased and on Conwell. They
showed that deceased had been intoxicated, but no alcohol was
4 198 Ark. 290, 128 S. W. 2d 986 (1939).
5 207 Ark. 154, 179 S. W. 2d 651 (1944).
8 Thompson v. Boswell, 166 F. 2d 106 (6th Cir. 1948).
7 54 N. M. 281, 222 P. 2d 606 (1950).
'IN. M. STAT. 1941 ANr;. § 24-101 et seq.
9 222 P. 2d at 607.
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found in the blood of Conwell. It was undisputed that the action
of deceased in parking his car on the open highway was negli-
gence per se, since the car was not disabled when stopped.10
The jury found, however, that the stopping of the car on the
pavement did not proximately contribute to the accident, and the
court was unable to say, as a matter of law, that the verdict for
plaintiff was unwarranted. There was thus the. anomalous situa-
tion that, despite evidence of intoxication and violation of high-
way laws, the presumption of diligence and due care in his favor
controlled in the absence of a showing that decedent's negligence
proximately contributed to the accident that resulted in his death.
IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE-SUBSTANCES SPRAYED FROM
OIL AND GAS WELLS
Oklahoma. Under a statute1 regarding the disposition of refuse
from oil and gas wells, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma recently
decided in a close decision that when oil, gas or salt water from
a well sprays over surrounding lands, negligence is imputed to
both the owner of the well and the drilling contractor without
proof of any specific acts of negligence on the part of either. This
appears to be an extension of liability, which has heretofore been
imposed only on the owner of the well.12
Such extension is, in all probability, indicative of the general
trend. In Franklin Drilling Co. v. Jacksoni" plaintiff Jackson sued
to recover damages for loss of growing crops, injuries to his un-
planted land and farm equipment, and for loss of use of living
quarters and the rights due him under his agricultural lease. In
holding liable both the oil company that owned the lease on the
adjoining tract and the drilling company, the court noted that the
statute was penal in character and designed to afford relief in
damages to an injured third party.14 Such third party may, with-
10 N. M. STAT. 1941 ANN. § 68-523, as applied in Duncai v. Madrid, 44 N. M. 249,
101 P. 2d 382 (1940), and Hisaw v. Hendrix, 54 N. M. 119,215 P. 2d 598 (1950).
11 52 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 296.
12 See Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Graham, 174 Okla. 436, 50 P. 2d
720 (1935).
13 ---------- Okla. .---- , 217 P. 2d 816 (1950).
14 C. L. McMahon, Inc. v. Lentz, 192 Okla. 153, 134 P. 2d 563 (1943).
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out proof of specific acts of negligence, recover damages from
either or both of the parties violating the statute.
The principal dissenting opinion agreed that the owner should
be held liable but argued forcefully that the drilling company
should be absolved by virtue of the fact that the duty (to prevent
the escape of harmful substances) sought to be imposed upon such
driller was nondelegable. A duty of prevention, it maintained,
could not be imposed on the driller by contract, and it was not so
imposed by statute. "In the absence of negligence, the privilege of
working for another does not in law entail responsibility for the
other's liabilities."15 The basis for the owner's liability is that he
has the right to elect whether to drill or not and from the fact that
he will be the ultimate beneficiary of the enterprise. Under this
reasoning, concluded the dissent, the drilling contractor had no
such right and, in the absence of specific negligence, ought not to
be held liable.
Another dissenting opinion agreed that both defendants should
have been held liable, but would so hold the drilling company
under the common law maxim, "sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas,"'6 as embodied in the Oklahoma Constitution 7 and stat-
utes.18
Res Ipsa Loquitur-INSTRUMENTALITY NOT IN SOLE
CONTROL OF DEFENDANT
Oklahoma. In a rather novel situation the Oklahoma Supreme
Court invoked the premise that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
cannot be relied upon until plaintiff has established (1) that which
caused the injury and (2) that the cause was under the sole con-
trol of the defendant or its servants. In the recent case of Terrell
v. First National Bank & Trust Co.'9 plaintiff was leaving the de-
fendant bank through a revolving door when the door suddenly
collapsed, causing her serious spinal injuries. After all the evi-
15 217 P. 2d at 822.
16,"Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another."
17 Art. II, §§ 6, 23.
Is 76 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 1.
19 ------------ Okla .............. 226 P. 2d 431 (1950).
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dence had been presented, the trial court directed a verdict for
defendant and gave judgment thereon.
On appeal, plaintiff contended that, under the evidence and
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,2" she was at least entitled
to have her case submitted to the jury.
The supreme court determined that the defendant was not in
sole and exclusive control of the revolving door at the time of its
collapse and held, as a matter of law, that the doctrine could not
be invoked. In fact, said the court, the plaintiff herself was operat-
ing the door in attempting to depart; the bank, therefore, lacked
the required control. Unless the instrumentality is under the sole
management and control of the defendant, and unless the accident
is of such a character that it can be said that it would not have
occurred but for a want of care on the part of such defendant, the
essentials of res ipsa loquitur are not present. It is submitted that
this is rather harsh on the plaintiff who is injured through no neg-
ligence of his own. Rather than the plaintiff controlling the offend-
ing instrumentality, the principal case appears to present a situa-
tion where control is exercised neither by plaintiff nor defendant.
In such a situation, perhaps a theory of "constructive" control
might afford an injured plaintiff the remedy he needs.
The holding in the principal case is in accord with authorities
elsewhere.' W. H. Fogleman, Jr.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY FOR
TORTIOUS CONDUCT
Louisiana. The recent case of Brantley v. Clarkson22 wrought
a change in Louisiana law pertaining to the vicarious liability of,
the community for the torts of the wife committed while operating;
a community automobile. Plaintiff brought suit against the Clark-
sons for personal injuries and damage to his automobile alleging
20 The transaction speaks for itself.
21 See Notes, 58 A. L. R. 140 (1929) and 100 A. L. R. 724 (1936).
22 217 La. 425, 46 So. 2d 614 (1950) ; see Note, 11 La. L. Rev. 190 (1951).
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that they were caused by Mrs. Clarkson's negligence in operating
an automobile belonging to the community. At the time of the
accident in question, Mrs. Clarkson was returning from a social
call on a neighbor. The trial court awarded judgment for the plain-tiff against both Mr. and Mrs. Clarkson.
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court
as to Mr. Clarkson on the authority of Adams v. Golson,23 although
the court expressed its disapproval of the rule of the case. It was
the opinion of the court in that case that in order to hold the hus-
band liable as head of the community for torts committed by the
wife, it must be affirmatively shown that she was attending to com-
munity affairs with her husband's express or implied authorization
at the time of the commission of the tort. The wife in Adams v.
Golson was on a pleasure trip at the time of her tortious conduct,
and the court held that a pleasure trip was not a community ac-
tivity within the purview of the foregoing rule.
The supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals as to Mr. Clarkson, and affirmed the judgment of the trial
court. The court expressed its agreement with the court of appeal's
disapproval of the rule of Adams v. Golson and adopted the court
of appeal's premise "that the legitimate pursuits of a wife...
should be considered as within the scope of community activi-
ties."" The court recognized that its ruling resulted in a change
in the law, but expressed its belief that if the community was to
be held liable for the tortious conduct of the husband while driv-
ing a community automobile for his own pleasure, the community
should also be liable for the tortious conduct of the wife under
the same circumstances.
In Louisiana parents are statutorily25 liable for all the torts of
their minor children, and the "family car doctrine" has been re-
jected by the Louisiana courts.26 As a result of Brantley v. Clark-
son, however, the Louisiana community can now be held liable not
only for the tortious conduct of the husband and minor children
23 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937).
24 Brantley v. Clarkson, 39 So. 2d 617, 620 (La. App. 1950).
25 LA. CIV. CODF (Dart, 1945) art. 2318.
26 See cases cited in Adams v. Golson, 174 So. at 878.
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while operating a community automobile for their own pleasure,
but it is also vicariously liable for the torts of the wife committed
while operating a community automobile for her pleasure.
APPLICABILITY OF THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE
Texas. In Massie v. Copeland27 the Texas Supreme Court re-
fused to extend and probably expressly limited the rule of Banker
v. McLaughlin8 as to the applicability of the attractive nuisance
doctrine in Texas. The two cases have very similar fact situations.
In each case the plaintiff's young son was drowned in a pit
partially filled with water, which was located on defendant's prop-
erty. In the Copeland case the pit was located within the city limits
of Floydada, Texas, and city officials had been permitted to create
the excavation by removing large quantities of caliche from the
land to use on the streets of the municipality. In the McLaughlin
case the pit was located on a subdivision which the defendant was
developing for home sites near Orange, Texas, and he used the
dirt dug from the pit on the streets in the subdivision. Neither of
the pits served a useful purpose, and the expense of draining either
pit would have been nominal. Of the two pits, the one involved in
the Copeland case was the more accessible to children. The facts
which the court considered as distinguishing the two cases were that
the McLaughlin child was only five years old, while the Copeland
boy was fourteen years of age.
The supreme court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff in the
McLaughlin case after an intensive review of the attractive nui-
sance doctrine in Texas and other jurisdictions.29 In the Copeland
case the trial court sustained a special exception to the plaintiff's
petition because it failed to state a cause of action. The court of
civil appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, being of the
opinion30 that the judgment was in conflict with the principles
27 ------------ Tex ------------ , 233 S. W .2d 449 (1950).
28 146 Tex. 434, 208 S. W. 2d 843 (1948).
29 See Notes, 3 Southwestern L. J. 78. 354 (1949).
30 "The question of whether or not a normal boy of the age, experience, capacity,
intelligence and understanding of the deceased Copeland boy had sufficient discre.
tion to know and understand the dangers of swimming in the pit in question and the
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stated in the McLaughlin case. The supreme court reversed the
court of civil appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court,
holding that the question as to whether a child could understand
and appreciate the danger of a so-called attractive nuisance was
a question of law for the court rather than a question of fact for
the jury. The court stated that the question had been so treated in
the McLaughlin case, and in support of its holding quoted from
a law review article discussing that case.
8
'
A dissenting opinion questioned the desirability of finally deter-
mining as a matter of law whether the individual in question
should be afforded the protection of the attractive nuisance doc-
trine without a full development of the facts bearing on the issue.
The question of the applicability of the attractive nuisance doc-
trine seems to have been assumed rather than decided in the Mc-
Laughlin case; therefore, it would seem to be a doubtful prece-
dent for the court's holding on the question. In any future case
seeking to invoke the attractive nuisance doctrine, however, it
seems clear that plaintiff's petition must develop the facts suf-
ficiently to satisfy the court that the child in question could not ap-
preciate the danger inherent in defendant's attractive nuisance as
a matter of law, or the case cannot reach the jury because of plain-
tiff's failure to state a cause of action.
DISCOVERED PERIL-POSSIBLE EXTRICATION A NECESSARY ISSUE
Texas. Sisti v. Thompson 2 is an affirmance by the Supreme
Court of Texas of the long standing rule in the lower Texas courts
that in addition to special issues on the usual elements83 of the
consequences of such is a fact question for the fact-finding body." Copeland v. Massie,
228 S. W. 2d 960, 967 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
31 "Every subsequent case will have to run the gauntlet of a court, first of the judge
who must find in the facts a duty to the particular child or parent, plus enough evi-
dence to raise an issue of its violation; and second, of a jury who, after considering all
the facts and circumstances of the case and what the prudent man should have antici-
pated as a probable result of the defendant's conduct in the particular case, must find
that the defendant violated his duty." (Emphasis added by the supreme court.) Green,
Landowners' Responsibility to Children, 27 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1948).
------------- Tex -------------. 229 S. W. 2d 610 (1950), afJ'g 224 S. W. 2d 500 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1949).
as These elements are: (1) plaintiff's perilous position; (2) defendant's discovery of
plaintiff's peril; and (3) defendant's failure to use reasonable means to avoid injury
to plaintiff.
[Vol. 5
1951] SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR 1950 355
doctrine of discovered peril, a special issue on the possible extri-
cation of the plaintiff from his position of peril is necessary in the
correct submission of the doctrine, if possible extrication is an
element of the case.84
In Sisti v. Thompson the deceased was operating a road main-
tainer which became hung up on the tracks of a railroad over
which deceased was attempting to pass. Deceased was causing the
maintainer to move backward and forward in an attempt to free
the maintainer from the entanglement when a train approached
the crossing. The crew of the train discovered that the maintainer
was on the track while still a sufficient distance away to have
stopped the train before reaching the crossing. Although the train
whistle was sounded several times, no attempt was made to stop
the train until about the time that the train collided with the main-
tainer. The trial court's submission of the doctrine of discovered
peril to the jury did not include a special issue on possible extri.
cation. The court of civil appeals held this to be error, and its
judgment was affirmed by the supreme court. It was held that in
this particular type of case, i.e., where the element of possible ex-
trication is present, a "clear and direct" submission of that ele-
ment is a necessary part of the submission of the doctrine of dis-
covered peril.
The court emphasized that such a requirement did not place an
undue burden on the plaintiff, as the doctrine of discovered peril
allows a person to escape the consequences of his own contribu-
tory negligence, which is ordinarily a complete defense to his
cause of action. At least one Texas case"5 held by implication that
the element of possible extrication is included in an issue on plain-
tiff's perilous position; however, the holding of the present case
seems more consistent with the Texas doctrine of special issue
submission in which each element of a case must be submitted to
the jury in a separate issue. The possibility of conflicting answers
to issues on perilous position and possible extrication is always
present where an issue on possible extrication is submitted sep-
84 See Note, 28 Tex. L. Rev. 880 (1950).
85Baker v. Shafter, 231 S. W. 349 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921).
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arately, but the jury can be returned to the jury room to resolve
any conflict. By obtaining consistent answers to separate special
issues on these elements of the doctrine of discovered peril, the
court can accurately determine whom the triers of the facts found
to be legally responsible for the accident in question.
JOINT TORTFEASORS-RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION OR INDEMNITY
Texas. The right of contribution or indemnity among joint tort-
feasors was considered by the Supreme Court of Texas again in
1950 in the case of Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis. 6 Two cases87 de-
cided by the supreme court in 1949 involved the application of
the statute"8 which provides for contribution among solvent joint
tortfeasors who are in pari delicto when no such right exists under
statute or at common law. 9 This statute was applied in the Lewis
case by the court of civil appeals."0
Plaintiff was injured in passing through a defective entrance to
a drug store from a parking garage, both of which were located
in an office building owned by the Capital National Bank of Austin
and occupied by the Motoramp Garage, the Renfro Drug Co.,
the bank, and the office building. The building was so constructed
that a person leaving his automobile in the parking garage could
enter the drug store without leaving the building and proceed
through the drug store either to the bank or to an office in the
building. The lease from the bank to the drug store store provided
that the drug store would permit persons leaving their automobiles
in the garage to pass through the drug store in going to and from
the bank or offices in the building, and that the bank would keep
the entrances to the drug store in good repair. The plaintiff brought
suit for negligence against the garage, the drug store, and the
bank, and recovered a judgment in the trial court which denied
any recovery against the garage, held the drug store and the bank
36 . -----.-....Tex -------------- 235 S. W. 2d 609 (1950).
37 Austin Road Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex. 430, 216 S. W. 2d 563 (1949), and Humble
Oil and Ref. Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222 S. W. 2d 995 (1949).
38 Tr.x. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 2212.
39 See Note, 4 Southwestern L. J. 349 (1950).
40 Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 228 S. W. 2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
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jointly and severally liable, and granted the drug store recovery
over against the bank by way of indemnity for any part of the
judgment it might be compelled to pay. The court of civil appeals
reversed that portion of the judgment allowing the drug store in-
demnity against the bank, holding that the bank and the drug store
were joint tortfeasors entitled to contribution under the statute
in that under the covenants in the lease there was a joint duty to
exercise care in keeping the premises in a safe condition for the
public.
The supreme court reversed that part of the judgment of the
court of civil appeals which denied the drug store indemnity
against the bank, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Finding no Texas cases in point on the facts, the court adopted
the following rule:
"Where the lessor or lessee has breached his covenant with respect to
the condition of the premises and the covenantee has had a judgment
entered against it or has been obliged to pay to third persons a claim
for damages caused by such breach, the covenantor must indemnify the
covenantee for the loss."' '4
The court held that the court of civil appeals erred in holding the
statute applicable, as it operates only where no right of contribu-
tion or indemnity is given by statute or exists at common law. The
right of indemnity was held to exist in Texas as to joint tortfeasors
not in pari delicto by virtue of common law. Since the plaintiff's
injury resulted from the breach of the bank's duty under the terms
of the lease to keep the entrances to the drug store in repair, the
drug store and the bank were not in pari delicto under the rule
that the court adopted.
The court's opinion further clarifies the application of the
statute governing contribution and, by adopting what appears to
be a desirable new rule of law concerning covenants to repair be-
tween lessor and lessee, will enable future leases to be contracted
with a better understanding of the possible tort liabilities of the
respective parties.
James R. Kinzer.
41235 S. W. 2d at 623; see Note, 157 A. L. R. 623 (1945).
